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REVERSE PRESUMPTIONS: GUILLEN V. PIERCE
COUNTY DISREGARDS REASONABLE

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF 23 U.S.C.
§ 409
Megan Walseth
Abstract: To prove that dangerous roadways caused their traffic accidents, plaintiffs often
seek discovery of highway information from state and local governments. Title 23 U.S.C.
§ 409 bars discovery of some of that information; it creates an evidentiary privilege for
materials and data collected for certain federal highway safety funding programs. For
example, state and local governments receiving funds through the federal hazard elimination
program codified at 23 U.S.C. § 152 must maintain an engineering survey of all state public
roads. Section 409, in turn, makes certain data and materials compiled or collected for § 152
exempt from discovery and inadmissible at trial. Courts have differed in interpreting § 409's
scope, with some state courts initially construing the privilege narrowly. Congress amended
the statute in 1995, expressing its intent to broaden those narrow interpretations. In Guillen v.
Pierce County, the Washington State Supreme Court held that this amendment-interpreted
as a significant expansion of the privilege-exceeded Congress' authority under the United
States Constitution and violated state sovereignty. This Note argues that the court's approach
to interpreting § 409 disregarded judicial principles that favor narrowly construing evidentiary
privileges and avoiding constitutional holdings. A narrow interpretation of the 1995
amendment would protect the integrity of state tort systems while fulfilling congressional
intent and adhering to established principles for construing statutes and evidentiary privileges.

Evidentiary privileges contradict the "ancient proposition of law" that
evidence is to be made freely available for the administration of justice.1
As such, judges created privileges only when necessary to protect
relationships and interests of overriding social importance. Legislatures
have created privileges extending beyond those of the common law;3 yet
like their common law counterparts, these statutory privileges are
construed narrowly.4 Courts apply an evidentiary privilege only to the
extent necessary to achieve its purpose.'

I. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,709 (1974).
2. See I JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 299 (5th ed. 1999).
3. See id. § 75, at312.
4. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208,218 (1961) ("Ours is the duty to avoid a
construction that would suppress otherwise competent evidence unless the statute, strictly construed,
requires such a result.").
5. See, e.g., Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash. 2d 270, 276-78, 677 P.2d 173, 177-78 (1984) (limiting
application of evidentiary statute to information likely to affect statute's purpose of promoting
candor in hospital peer reviews).
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Title 23 U.S.C. § 409 creates a statutory privilege for certain data and
materials collected for federal highway safety programs. State and local
governments may assert this federal privilege in state tort cases,
defending against allegations that their design or maintenance of a
roadway caused a traffic accident.7 Plaintiffs pursuing negligent highway
design claims may seek government highway data to demonstrate that
their accident sites were inherently hazardous 8 or to prove that road
authorities had knowledge of dangerous conditions.9 A court's
construction of the § 409 privilege may determine whether such evidence
is discoverable.' 0
In Guillen v. Pierce County," the Washington State Supreme Court
reviewed a trial court's application of § 409 to a discovery dispute.' In
this case of first impression in Washington, 3 the court interpreted a 1995
amendment to § 409 as a broad expansion of the privilege, extending the
statute's scope to encompass much of the state's publicly collected
highway data. 4 Having broadly interpreted the 1995 amendment, the
Washington State Supreme Court declined to enforce the amended
statute, holding instead that the amendment exceeded the authority
6. 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Exparte Ala. Dep't of Transp., 757 So. 2d 371, 372 (Ala. 1999) (claiming privilege
for accident reports sought by plaintiff to show that intersection's design caused hydroplaning).
8. See, e.g., id Proving that a roadway did not meet design standards, which are often adopted by
statute, may require evidence of traffic volume and accident history. See, e.g., FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES § 4C (1988
ed.) [hereinafter MUTCD]. See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 468-95-010 (2001) (enacted pursuant to
WASH. REV. CODE § 47.36.020 (2001)) (adopting MUTCD as uniform state standard for roadway
signing).
9. See WILLIAM E. KENWORTHY, KILLER ROADS: FROM CRASH To VERDICT § 1-3, 9 (2nd ed.
1999 & 2001 supp.). Notice is not officially an element of a negligent design claim, because
governments are alleged to have committed an affirmative act of negligence-failure to adhere to
design standards when constructing a road. See id. § 6-1, at 151. However, plaintiffs unable to prove
negligence according to historical design standards may use accident data to prove that governments
knew or should have known that a road had become unsafe, and should have updated it according to
modem standards. See id. § 1-3, at 9.
10. Compare, e.g., Lusby v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 4 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
section 409 protects state highway accident data from discovery) with Wiedeman v. Dixie Elec.
Membership Corp., 627 So.2d 170, 173 (La. 1994) (holding that section 409 does not protect
unedited factual material such as accident reports).
11. 144 Wash. 2d 696,31 P.3d 628 (2001), cert. granted,70 U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2002)
(No. 01-1229).
12. See id. at 706, 31 P.3d at 635.
13. Id. at717, 31 P.3dat640.
14. See id. at 727, 31 P.3d at 646.
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granted to Congress by the United States Constitution. 15 The statute,
16
according to the court, was constitutional only in its pre-1995 form.
The Washington State Supreme Court's approach to interpreting § 409
disregards judicial principles that evidentiary privileges should be
construed narrowly and that constitutional holdings should be avoided
where reasonable alternative statutory interpretations exist. This Note
argues that a narrow interpretation of the 1995 amendment would protect
the integrity of state tort systems while implementing congressional
intent and adhering to established principles of construction. After
reviewing federal and state laws requiring highway data collection, Part I
of this Note introduces § 409. Part II discusses judicial principles
favoring the narrow construction of evidentiary privileges and the
avoidance of constitutional questions. Part III provides an overview of
other state and federal court interpretations of § 409. Part IV situates
prior cases upholding § 409's constitutionality within the context of
Congress' spending power. Part V describes Guillen v. Pierce County.
Part VI argues that congressional intent and principles of construction
dictate a narrow interpretation of § 409, and that the statute is
constitutional.
I.

FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS REQUIRE COLLECTION OF
HIGHWAY DATA

Federal funding programs, enacted to improve national highway
safety, require participating states to report highway data and maintain
engineering surveys. 7 The surveys may utilize highway data whose
collection is also required by Washington State statutes and regulations."8
Section 409 creates a privilege for highway data collected for certain
federal programs, preempting state discovery rules. 19

15. Id. at 743-44, 31 P.3d at 655.
16. Id.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.B
19. See infra Part I.C.
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FederalHighway Safety ProgramsRequire ComprehensiveData
Collection

Introducing its first major highway safety initiative in 1966, Congress
reported that more Americans had died on the country's highways than
in all its wars combined; in 1965 alone, highway accidents caused 49,000
deaths.20 In response to a finding that inadequate research, resources, and
national coordination had been devoted to this problem, the Highway
Safety Act of 1966 directed states to develop comprehensive programs to
reduce traffic accidents, in conformity with federal standards. 2 The 1966
Act provided funding and established standards for training and
education, vehicle inspection, highway design and surveillance systems,
and accident record-keeping systems.2 2 It also directed states to collect
and report such data as the federal government required.'
Since 1966, Congress has expanded federal highway safety funding to
cover actual roadway improvement projects and has correspondingly
increased data collection requirements.2 4 In 1973, reporting that highway
deaths had climbed to 56,000 in 1972 and threatened to rise to 80,000 by
1980,25 Congress established several ongoing safety enhancement
funding programs for hazard elimination, 6 railroad crossings, 7 and
highway bridge projects.2 8 Extensive evaluation and reporting
requirements accompanied these programs.2 9
The hazard elimination program, in particular, aimed to encourage
states to systematically identify and eliminate hazardous locations and
roadside obstacles. 30 Accordingly, to receive federal funds, t states must

20. S. REP. No. 89-1302, at 3 (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2741, 2743.
21. Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, § 101, 80 Stat. 731 (1966) (codified as
amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 402-403 and other scattered sections).
22. See S. REP. No. 89-1302, at 5,7, 10-11.
23. 23 USC § 402(a) (2000).
24. See Highway Safety Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, §201, 87 Stat. 250,282 (1973).
25. H.R. REP. No. 93-118, at 31 (1973), reprintedin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1859, 1888.
26. 23 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
27. Id. § 130.
28. Id. § 144. The five original "action programs" are described at H.R. REP. No. 93-118, at 32
(1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1859, 1889-90.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 93-118, at 37.
30. See H.R. REP. No. 93-118, at 39-41.
31. Federal funds provide ninety percent of § 152 project costs. 23 U.S.C. § 152(d). Funds were
originally restricted to projects on the federal-aid highway system, but were made available for
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develop and maintain an engineering survey of all state public roads,
identifying hazardous locations and implementing improvement projects
according to prioritized schedules.3 In Washington, the state Department
of Transportation disburses federal funds to local governments whose
applications comply with the program's conditions.33 The applications
require information on accident history, traffic volumes, and proposed
solutions for particular sites.
B.

Washington State Laws and Regulations also Require Data
Collection

Some of the data used for federal programs, including accident
statistics and traffic volume data, may be routinely gathered by state and
local governments to comply with state law mandates. 35 For instance,
Washington law requires law enforcement officers to report significant
accidents to the Washington State Patrol. 36 The Washington State Patrol
must analyze all accident reports, publish a monthly statistical report, and
make the reports available to other public entities for further analysis.37
Other Washington statutes are less specific, but may likewise require
the collection and analysis of highway data. For example, state adoption
of roadway signing standards38 implies data-gathering requirements:
before installing a traffic signal at an intersection, transportation
authorities must analyze traffic volume data or accident history to show
that design standards warrant a signal.39 Other statutes direct all counties

projects on any state road in 1982. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97424, § 125,96 Stat. 2097,2113 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3639, 3657.
32. 23 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1). The railway crossing improvement program requires similar data
collection and reporting. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 130(d) (survey and schedule of projects), § 130(g)
(annual report).
33. See Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 725-27, 31 P.3d 628, 645 (2001), cert
granted,70 U.S.LW. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2002) (No. 01-1229).
34. Id. at 726, 31 P.3d at 645. Collision diagrams may be used to develop proposed solutions.
Third Declaration of Thomas G.Ballard, P.E., County Engineer, Guillen v. Pierce County, No. 96-213404-5, Superior Court, 9/30/97.
35. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.52.030(3) (2001); Id. § 46.52.070 (2001).
37. Id. § 46.52.060.
38. See supranote 8.
39. See supranote 8.
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to classify county roads according to traffic volume and speed4" and
develop six-year coordinated transportation plans.4 The Washington
Model Traffic Ordinance instructs local government traffic divisions to
maintain suitable systems for filing accident reports.42 Though state law
43
would generally permit discovery of these materials in tort suits,
defendant governments have claimed the § 409 privilege when the
materials are also used for federal programs.'
C.

Section 409 Was Enacted to Mitigate LitigationImpact of
Federally-RequiredRecordkeeping

In 1987, recognizing that state compliance with federal safety
programs made additional evidence available to tort plaintiffs,4 5 Congress
enacted 23 U.S.C. § 409.46 Prior to its amendment in 1995, § 409
provided that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys,
schedules, lists, or data compiled for the purpose of identifying,
evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement of potential
accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-highway
crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144 and 152 of this title or for
the purpose of developing any highway safety construction
improvement project which may be implemented utilizing Federalaid highway funds shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into
evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding or considered for
other purposes in any action for damages arising from any
occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed in such reports,
surveys, schedules, lists, or data. 47

40. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.86.070 (2001). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 136-60-020 (2001)
(describing data required for county road inventories).
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.81.121 (2001).
42. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 308-330-240 (2001). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 136-28-010
(2001) (requiring coordination to implement accident reporting requirements of Highway Safety Act
of 1966).
43. See, e.g., Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 716, 31 P.3d 628, 640 (2001), cert.
granted,70 U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2002) (No. 01-1229).
44. See, e.g., id. at 725, 31 P.3d at 645.
45. See id. at 717-718, 31 P.3d at 641.
46. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 132, 101 Stat. 134, 170 (1987)
(codified at 23 U.S.C. § 409).
47. 23 U.S.C. § 409 (1994) (emphasis added).
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While agreeing that § 409 has no legislative history,48 courts have
consistently inferred two purposes for the legislation.49 First, Congress
sought to prevent federal record-keeping requirements from creating an
additional piece of ready-made evidence for private litigants." Second,
Congress wanted to encourage the "free flow" of safety information5
and the candid evaluation of local safety hazards.5 2 Permitting
governments to obtain safety information "free from the fear of future
tort actions"' 3 has been said to promote the federal government's interest
in obtaining complete and accurate highway information54 and ensuring
deliberative spending of federal funds.5"
Section 409 expressly preempts state laws and court rules that would
allow plaintiffs to obtain and use some government highway data in tort
cases,5 6 but the privilege has not been construed to grant governments
complete immunity from negligence suits. Though legislation enacted
pursuant to Congress' constitutional authority preempts inconsistent state
laws,58 state tort systems have continued to operate alongside federal
transportation safety schemes.59 Section 409's impact on state tort

48. See, e.g., Kitts v. Norfolk and W. Ry., 152 F.R.D. 78, 82 n.14 (S.D.W.Va. 1993); Palacios v.
La. and Delta R.R., 740 So. 2d 95, 98 (La. 1999). See also H. CONF. REP. NO. 100-27, at 172-73
(1987), reprintedin 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 66, 156-57.
49. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
50. Light v. State, 560 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1990). See also Robertson v. Union Pac.
R.R., 954 F.2d 1433, 1435 (8th Cir. 1992).
51. See Perkins v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 584 N.E.2d 794, 802 (Ohio App. 1989), cause
dismissed,566 N.E.2d 673, reh'gdenied, 570 N.E.2d 281 (Ohio 1991).
52. See Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R., 790 P.2d 595,597 (Utah App. 1990).
53. Perkins,584 N.E.2d at 802.
54. Palacios,740 So. 2d at 98 n.6. This expression of the federal interest comes from the United
States' amicus curiae brief in Ex parte State Highway Department, 572 So. 2d 389 (Ala. 1990).
Palacios,740 So. 2d at 98 n.6. The Solicitor General argued that disclosing highway hazard reports
and data would 'jeopardize" federal programs by deterring states from compiling the "complete and
accurate information" upon which the programs depend. Id at 98 n.6 (citation omitted).
55. Martinolich v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 532 So. 2d 435,438 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
56. Dep't of Transp. v. Superior Court (Tate), 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2,4 (1996).
57. See Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1281 (S.D. Ala. 2001).
58. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
59. Cf. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 668 (1993) (noting that the "hit-or-miss
common law method [does not necessarily run] counter to a statutory scheme of planned
prioritization").
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systems depends upon how broadly courts construe its preemptive
scope."
II.

COURTS NARROWLY CONSTRUE PRIVILEGES AND
AVOID CONSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS

Judicial principles counsel narrow construction of evidentiary
privileges6 ' and disfavor constitutional holdings. 2 Specifically, courts
will construe an evidentiary privilege narrowly and apply it to effectuate
its purpose. 3 In addition, when two interpretations of a statute are
reasonable, courts will attempt to adopt an interpretation that sustains the
statute's constitutionality."
A.

Evidentiary PrivilegesAre ConstruedNarrowly To Promote
ParticularGoals

Whether created by judges or by statute, an evidentiary privilege
should be construed narrowly 65 and strictly limited to the purpose for
which it exists. 6 6 For example, courts apply the attorney-client privilege
only to the extent necessary to achieve its purpose of encouraging clients
to make full disclosure to their attorneys for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice.67 Accordingly, the privilege is not applied to pre-existing
documents obtainable from the client prior to their transfer to an
attorney, 68 nor to communications made for reasons other than obtaining
legal advice. 9

60. See, e.g., S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Yarnell, 890 P.2d 611, 613 (Ariz. 1995) (noting that broad
construction of pre-1995 statute would "sacrifice" state tort system on "altar" of federal scheme);
Miguez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 645 So. 2d 1184, 1189 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that broad
construction would deny accident victims their only system of redress).
61. See infra Part H.A.
62. See infra Part l.B.
63. See infra Part II.A.
64. See infra Part H.B.
65. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974).
66. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,403 (1976) (limiting common law privilege to
its purpose); Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash. 2d 270, 276, 677 P.2d 173, 177 (1984) (limiting statutory
privilege to its purpose).
67. Fisher,425 U.S. at 403.
68. L (noting that denying the privilege to pre-existing documents held by an attorney, but that
would have been obtainable from the client prior to their transfer to the attorney, would not
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Statutory evidentiary privileges are also restricted to their purposes.
For example, one federal statute provided that "no part" of a National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident investigation report could
be used as evidence.7" Yet application of the privilege was guided by
judicial interpretation of the statute's purpose-to prevent the NTSB's
conclusions from influencing the fact-finder's assignment of causation.71
On the basis of this understanding of the statute's purpose, and despite
the plain language of the statute, some courts permitted introduction of
any part of a report that did not reveal the NTSB's conclusion.72 Even
when assuming instead that a privilege for investigative reports' was
enacted to promote truthful investigations and reporting, one court
admitted factual testimony gathered for a report.74 The court reasoned
that because preparing for litigation was but one of many reasons for
investigating accidents, permitting discovery of factual testimony would
not significantly affect the conduct of the investigation or the veracity of
its factual findings7
Washington courts apply similar principles.76 Interpreting a state
statute that protected the reports and proceedings of hospital peer review
committees, the Washington State Supreme Court restricted the statute's

discourage the plaintiff from sharing them with the attorney). See also STRONG, supra note 2, § 89,
at 359- 360.
69. Communications made for the purpose of perpetuating a crime or fraud are not privileged.
STRONG, supra note 2, § 95. Communications with attorneys retained to give business, rather than
legal, advice are also not privileged. See, e.g., United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir.
1996).
70. 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2000).
71. Lorri E. Badolato, Opinion, Probable Cause, Factual Investigation: The Admissibility Of
NTSB Reports and Investigator's Opinions In Aviation Accident Litigation, 4 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
App. ADvoc. 25,30-31 (1999).
72. See, e.g., Curry v. Chevron, USA, 779 F.2d, 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1985). But see Prospectus
Alpha Navigation v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986) (excluding
report in its entirety).
73. 45 U.S.C. § 41 (1988) (repealed 1994) (privilege for required railroad accident reports).
74. Yanich v. Pa. R.R. Co., 192 F. Supp. 373, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). But see Craddock v. Queen
City Coach Co., 141 S.E.2d 798, 800 (N.C. 1965) (requiring disclosure of data upon which report
was based would violate spirit and purpose of statutory privilege for required automobile accident
reports).
75. See Yanich, 192 F. Supp. at 377. Cf. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 746 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 2000)
(stating that statutory purpose of promoting candid and accurate accident information not adversely
impacted by conditional disclosure of accident data in criminal case).
76. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 51 Wash. App. 807, 812, 755 P.2d 825, 828 (1988) (strictly
construing statutory privileges).
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scope and application to its purposes. 77 The court indicated that it would
prevent the statute from obstructing discovery of information generated
outside committee meetings and available from "original sources"
merely because it was introduced at a meeting.78 In applying the statute,
the Washington State Supreme Court considered whether discovery of
particular information would interfere with the statutory purpose of
preventing an advantage to tort plaintiffs and promoting candid
communications.79
B.

Courts Sustain a Statute's ConstitutionalityWhere Possible

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional.8" Thus, if an otherwise
permissible construction of a statute would create serious constitutional
problems, and an alternative interpretation is "fairly possible," courts
construe the statute to avoid such problems."' This long-established
circumspection arises from a prudential policy to avoid making
constitutional law unnecessarily, and from the assumption that Congress
intended to fulfill its oath to uphold the Constitution. 2 Though courts
will not adopt a saving construction that is strained or plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress, 3 the "elementary rule is that every reasonable
construction must 'be resorted to, in order to save a statute from

unconstitutionality."

77. Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash. 2d 270, 276, 677 P.2d 173, 177 (1984).
78. ld. at 277.
79. Id. at 274-75, 278, 677 P.2d at 176, 178.
80. See Island County v. State, 135 Wash. 2d 141, 146, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (1998).
81. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)).
82 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988). For a statement of the constitutional avoidance doctrine as applied in Washington State
courts, see Island County, 135 Wash. 2d at 146-47, 955 P.2d at 380 (1998), in which the
Washington State Supreme Court stated that legislation must be unconstitutional "beyond a
reasonable doubt," and State ex rel. Faulk v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 493, 500, 816 P.2d 725,
729 (1991), which held that a saving construction will be adopted, where possible.
83. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523,538 (9th Cir. 2002). See also DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575.
84. DeBartolo,485 U.S. at 575 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648,657 (1895)).

960

Guillen v. Pierce County
III. THE SCOPE OF 23 U.S.C. § 409 IS UNSETTLED
Courts have differed in interpreting the scope of § 409, especially in
construing its protection of data "compiled" for a federal purpose."
Though Congress addressed the phrase "data compiled" in a 1995
amendment, divergent interpretations of the necessary federal purpose
persist.8 6 Courts have permitted plaintiffs to obtain evidence from
sources unconnected to federal funding programs and have continued to
scrutinize "the purpose" for which privileged materials must have been
collected.87
A.

Priorto 1995, a Number of Courts Interpreted§ 409's "Data
Compiled" and FederalPurpose RequirementsNarrowly

Before 1995, § 409 protected data and materials "compiled" to
identify and design federally funded safety improvement projects.8 8
Courts disagreed about whether data and materials "compiled" included
the factual data an agency used to prepare the documents specifically
required by federal statutes.8 9 Yet even when courts agreed that this
factual data was eligible for the privilege, courts differed as to the federal
purpose needed to apply the privilege.90
1.

Priorto 1995, Some State Courts Interpretedthe Phrase "Data
Compiled" to Exclude All Raw Data and Pre-ExistingMaterials

Before Congress amended § 409, some state courts interpreted the
privilege for materials "compiled" pursuant to a federal program to
exclude any raw data or pre-existing documents used in preparing
documents specifically required by federal statutes. 9 Using a definition
85. See infra Part llI.A.
86. See infra Parts lI.B and III.C.
87. See infra Part II.C.
88. 23 U.S.C. § 409 (1994).
89. Compare Lusby v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 4 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 1993> (extending privilege
to vehicle count and accident data that state highway department used to comply with federal
program), with Wiedeman v. Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 627 So. 2d 170, 173 (La. 1994)
(holding that privilege does not cover raw data, including accident reports and traffic counts,
gathered for use in privileged studies and surveys). See also infra Part II.A.1.
90. See infra Part lII.A.2.
91. See, e.g., Wiedeman, 627 So. 2d at 173. But see Seaton v. Johnson, 898 S.W.2d 232, 237
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that all records "used or usable" for federal program are privileged).
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of "compile" that included only the creation of a new document from
existing sources,92 these courts limited the range of documents eligible
for the § 409 privilege to "end product[s]" created for a federal
program.93 Under this interpretation, § 409 protected data compilations
made for a federal program, but did not protect materials gathered to
produce the compilations.94
In limiting the range of potentially privileged documents, these courts
sought to protect state tort systems by preventing § 409 from shielding
the underlying facts contained in final federal funding documents.95 The
courts' response may have been exaggerated; no court has applied § 409
to all facts contained in privileged documents. Even courts taking a
broader view of the "compiled" documents to which § 409 might apply
have only barred evidence of facts contained in those 96documents when
plaintiffs obtainedthe facts from privileged documents.
2.

Courts Also Disputed § 409's FederalPurposeRequirement

Courts taking a broader approach to § 409's scope-agreeing that
"data compiled" included materials other than "end products"---did not
reach identical results; these courts applied the privilege differently
based on their interpretations of the federal purpose required for § 409
protection. 97 For example, one federal court implicitly acknowledged that
the phrase "data compiled" could include informal collections of data
92. See Wiedeman, 627 So. 2d at 173. "Compile" may also signify the less creative process of
gathering information and records from various sources into a single collection. Compare John Doe
Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 154 (1989) (using "the word 'compile' [to refer] to the
process of gathering... records and information that were generated on an earlier occasion and for a
different purpose.") with id. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'compiled' does not always refer simply
to 'the process of gathering,' . . . but often has the connotation of a more creative activity.").
93. See Wiedeman, 627 So. 2d at 173. See also S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Yarnell, 890 P.2d 611, 613
(Ariz. 1995) (holding that the documents section 409 protects are "precisely the documents
described and prepared under the authority of §§ 130, 144, and 152, and no others").
94 Yarnell, 890 P.2d at 613.
95. See, e.g., id. (noting that to construe statute to cover all facts included in protected documents
would impair state tort system).
96. See, e.g., Robertson v. Union Pac. R.R., 954 F.2d 1433, 1435 (8th Cir. 1992) (extending
privilege to all data utilized for purposes of monitoring rail safety, but permitting plaintiff's expert to
rely on own observations and information from the Federal Railroad Administration).
97. Compare Hickey v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 803 P.2d 275, 279 (Or. App. 1990) (allowing
plaintiff to access data and ranking formula routinely used by state since 1968, because not compiled
for specific purposes covered by § 409), with Lusby v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 4 F.3d 639, 641 (8th
Cir. 1993) (protecting state materials even if not compiled solely for federal purposes).
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and materials," but only when gathered "for the purpose" of federal
safety programs.99 The court refused to extend the privilege to
information and documents obtained from employees not responsible for
federal program activities,' but did apply the privilege to "documents or
computer data in the possession of [one employee]-a compilation of
information" gathered for the federal safety program."' Thus a collection
of documents and digital information was a privileged "compilation,"
even though the court strictly construed § 409's requirement that
privileged 2 materials be collected for "the purpose" of a federal
program. 10
In contrast, other courts that applied § 409 to a wide range of
documents and information also broadly construed the federal purpose
requirement. 3 For example, the Eighth Circuit extended the privilege to
accident data and traffic counts prepared by the state highway
department, even though the information was not collected or used solely
to obtain federal funding."° Instead of looking within the defendant
entity to scrutinize the purpose of data collection,'0 5 the Eighth Circuit
held that any data created by the highway department and later used for
federal programs met the requisite federal purpose. 6
B.

In a 1995 Amendment, Congress Clarifiedthat "Data Compiled"
Included Raw Data andPre-existingDocuments

In 1995, Congress registered its disagreement with narrow
interpretations of the term "data compiled,"'0 7 amending § 409 to
98. See Kitts v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 152 F.R.D. 78,82 (S.D.W.Va. 1993).
99. Id. at 81 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 409) (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 81-82.
101. Id. at 82.
102. See id. at 81 (declining to protect materials prepared or compiled for a "separate and distinct
purpose" even if parts of them became "ingredients throvm into a soup kettle with a distinct flavor of
safety enhancemene').
103. See, e.g., Lusby v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 4 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 1993); Robertson v. Union
Pac. R.R., 954 F.2d 1433, 1435 (8th Cir. 1992). Cf. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 544 N.W.2d 709 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that documents
protected by the pre-1995 § 409 are inadmissible even if they "fulfill[] a state as well as a federal
function").
104. Lusby, 4 F.3d at 641.
105. See supranotes 100-02 and accompanying text.
106. See Lusby, 4 F.3d at 641.
107. H.R. REP. No. 104-246, at 59 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 522,551.
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encompass materials and data compiled "or collected" for the purposes
described.' 0 8 The accompanying House Report is the only legislative
history available:
This clarification is included in response to recent State court
interpretations of the term 'data compiled' in the current section
409 of title 23. It is intended that raw data collected prior to being
made part of any formal or bound report shall not be subject to
discovery or admitted into evidence." 9
While clarifying that "data compiled" could include raw data and preexisting documents as well as formal, bound documents created for a
federal program, Congress did not expressly address the statutory
requirement that protected materials be collected "for the purpose of'
evaluating projects for federal funding."'
C.

After the Amendment, Some Courts Have Continued To Interpret
§ 409 Narrowly

The 1995 amendment forced courts to extend the § 409 privilege to
raw data and pre-existing documents collected for the requisite federal
purpose."' Yet even where a public entity gathers pre-existing
documents for a federal purpose, some courts have permitted plaintiffs to
obtain the same documents from their original creators." 2 Furthermore,
courts have continued to scrutinize the purpose for which agencies
collect materials."13
Some courts have found that data and records originally created by
one state entity for state purposes need not become inadmissible because
another state entity uses the information to apply for federal funding." 4
Courts have indicated that data collected and used by a federal-funding

108. National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-59, § 323, 109 Stat.
568, 591 (emphasis added to the statutory amendment).
109. H.R. REP. NO. 104-246, at 59.
110. See, e.g., Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 750, 31 P.3d 628, 658 (Madsen, J.,
concurring), cert. granted,70 U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2002) (No. 01-1229).
111. See, e.g., Isbell ex rel. Isbell v. State, 9 P.3d 322, 324 (Ariz. 2000).
112. See infra notes 114-20.
113. See infra notes 122-27.
114. See, e.g., Ex parte Ala. Dep't of Transp., 757 So. 2d 371, 374 (Ala. 1999); Palacios v. La.
and Delta R.R., 775 So. 2d 698, 703 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
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applicant may still be obtained from its original source,"1 ' though no case
has involved a request from such a source. One court denied discovery of
accident records from the defendant highway department, which the
court found had collected the records for a federal program," 6 but
indicated that the plaintiff could obtain the information from the law
enforcement agency that had originally created the accident reports." 7
Other courts' decisions imply agreement with this position."' One court
that denied discovery from a state highway department emphasized that
its holding simply prohibited the plaintiff from relying on the highway
department for discovery. 19 In the same case, a state appeals court later
noted that because the highway department's data had "necessarily been
compiled from various sources," the data would "undoubtedly" be
discoverable from other sources.2 The court thus implied that only
entities that apply for federal funding may claim the privilege.''
Other courts interpreting the amended statute have rejected even a
federal-funding applicant's assertion that documents were collected or
compiled for the requisite federal purpose. One court held that accident
reports would be admissible-even though used by the highway
department to prepare documents for federal funding-because the state
had historically collected and compiled accident reports for purposes
other than obtaining federal funding. Another court reasoned that
documents prepared primarily for state purposes are not protected by
§ 409, even when they refer to a federally-funded project.' 3 Courts have
also required a strict showing that data was collected for the particular

115. See, e.g., ExparteAla. Dep'tof Transp., 757 So. 2d at 374; Palacios,775 So. 2d at 703.
116. ExparteAla. Dep'tofTransp.,757So. 2d at 373-74.
117. Id. at 374. Accord Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 177 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 n.5 (S.D. Ala.
2001).
118. See Palacios v. La. & Delta R.R., 740 So. 2d 95, 102 (La. 1999); Palacios v. La. and Delta
RJ., 775 So. 2d 698,703 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
119. Palacios,740 So. 2d at 102.
120. Palacios,775 So. 2d at 703 (emphasis in original).
121. See id. See also Guillen v. Pierce County, 96 Wash. App. 862, 871-72, 982 P.2d 123, 129
(Div. 2 1999) (reasoning that documents would be available from sheriff who created them, but not
from highway department who collected them for a federal program).
122. Irion v. State, 760 So. 2d 1220, 1226 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
123. See Isbell ex rel. Isbell v. State, 9 P.3d 322, 323-24 (Ariz. 2000). 'This obligation [to issue
orders to repair hazardous crossings] existed with or without federal funding." Id. at 323-24. The
court's holding was based more on its conclusion that an "order" is not a document type listed in

§ 409. Id.
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federal programs referenced in § 409.I Yet even when construing the
federal purpose requirement more broadly,2' courts have required a
"threshold level of causal connection"1 26 or a "substantial nexus"' 27 to a
federal program.
IV. COURTS HAVE UPHELD § 409 AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL SPENDING POWER
When Congress legislates within its constitutional authority, its acts
preempt state law; 128 yet when Congress exceeds its constitutional
powers, its laws have no preemptive authority. 29 Though the present
United States Supreme Court has constricted congressional power
relative to the states in some areas, 3 ' the Court has not altered its broad
interpretation of Congress' spending power. 3 ' Courts reviewing § 409
have found it a constitutional exercise of the federal spending power,
validly preempting state rules of evidence and discovery.'32

124. Dep't of Transp. v. Superior Court (Tate), 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 5, 6-7 (1996) (denying
privilege because of failure to show that data related to hazard elimination, rather than the more
comprehensive federal safety programs codified at 23 U.S.C. § 402). See also Isbell, 9 P.3d at 323
(holding that protected documents are those described in and prepared for the federal programs
referenced in § 409). See also supranotes 22-23 and accompanying text.
125. See Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1278 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (rejecting
"but for" purpose requirement); Coniker v. State, 695 N.Y.S.2d 492, 496-97 (N.Y. Ct. CL. 1999)
(rejecting "ordinary course of business" exception),
126. See Powers, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
127. Reynolds v. City of New York, 679 N.Y.S.2d 372,373 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
128. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land .... ").
129. Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 730, 31 P.3d 628, 647-48 (2001) (citing
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)), cert. granted,70 U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29,
2002) (No. 01-1229).
130. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Revival of States' Rights: A ProgressReport and a Proposal,
22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95,95-96 (1998).
131. See Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the FederalistRevival, 4 CHAP. L REv. 195,
195-97 (2001).
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. ("Congress shall have Power to ... provide for the... general
Welfare of the United States."). See Palacios v. La. & Delta R.R., 775 So. 2d 698, 703-04 (La. Ct.
App. 2000); Martinolich v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 532 So. 2d 435, 438, (La. CL App. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Martinolich, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989); Claspill v. Mo.
Pac. R.R., 793 S.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Mo. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
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A.

The Spending Clause Requires Only a Rational Connection
Between Funding Condition and Funding Purpose

Under the Spending Clause, Congress may condition federal funds
upon state compliance with federal directives.' Though the United
States Supreme Court has identified some limits on the spending power,
the limits are seldom enforced to invalidate a spending condition. 3 '
Courts have required only a minimally rational connection between
funding conditions and the purpose of federal spending.' 35
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed Congress' power to
encourage state regulation by attaching conditions to federal spending. 36
By offering conditional federal funds to encourage state compliance with
federal policies, Congress may achieve results that would have been
outside its enumerated powers absent the state's decision to accept the
funds.' 37 In exercising its spending power, Congress generates legislation
"much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the [s]tates
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions."'3 Acceptance of the
funds by a state or its authorized agent constitutes acceptance of attached
conditions, binding the state and its political subdivisions. 39
Spending conditions are often expressed as an explicit quid pro quo,
as when Congress requires states to implement a federally funded
program according to federal regulations, or risk losing funds. 4 ' Yet
Congress may also legislate under the spending power without expressly
threatening to withhold funds.' 4' For example, Congress has made it a

133. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
134. See infira note 145.
135. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
136. See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[tlhere are no recent
relevant instances in which the Supreme Court has invalidated a funding condition.").
137. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). See also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of

Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the spending clause
permits Congress to legislate in traditional areas of state concern otherwise outside its reach).
138. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). See also CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 667 (1993) (describing federal railroad safety act as a "bargain"
under which recipient states must take certain steps to ensure that federal funds are efficiently spent).
139. See, e.g., James Island Pub. Serv. Dist. v. City of Charleston, 249 F.3d 323, 329, 330 (4th
Cir. 2001) (authorizing special purpose district to issue bonds for federal government loans binds
state and its political subdivisions to terms of loan agreements); Glenpool Util. Servs. Auth. v. Creek
County Rural Water Dist., 861 F.2d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 1988).
140. See Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1194, 1198 (describing the Child Support Enforcement Program).
141. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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federal crime to bribe a state or local official in a state or locality that
receives more than $10,000 in federal funds. 42 Courts and commentators
have treated the statute as a spending condition because the state or
143
locality can avoid the statute's application by refusing federal funds.
The United States Supreme Court has identified constitutional
limitations on spending conditions,1" but the limitations are so rarely
enforced that they may be "more apparent than real" or "not
justiciable.', 145 First, congressional spending must be in pursuit of the
general welfare. 14 Second, the conditions attached to such spending must
be unambiguous, enabling states to understand the consequences of their
participation. 47 Third, grants and conditions must be related to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs.148 Fourth,
spending conditions may not encourage states to violate other
constitutional provisions. 49 The Court has also suggested that financial
incentives could be invalid if so coercive as to constitute compulsion
rather than encouragement. 5 ' Of these five limitations, the one
concerned with "relatedness" is most important to a spending clause
analysis of § 409. In addition to significant commentary advocating a
closer nexus between federal interest and condition,' 5 ' the relatedness

142 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).
143. See George D. Brown, Stealth Statute-Corruption,The Spending Power,and The Rise of 18
U.S.C. § 666,73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 292 (1998). See also United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d
468, 487 n.7 (6th Cir. 2001) (Boggs, C.J., dissenting in part); United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp.
110, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
144. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
145. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrrlONAL LAW § 5-6, at 838 (3rd ed. 2000).
146. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. The Court noted that the high level of deference to Congress'
judgment on this element made it unlikely that the restriction is judicially enforceable. Id.
147. Id. This limitation is essentially synonymous with the "clear statement" rule of statutory
construction, under which courts will interpret a statute to alter the traditional federal-state balance
only when Congress' intent is unambiguous. See TRIBE, supra note 145, § 5-6, at 838 n.23; see also
id. § 5-9.
148. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
149. Id. at 208,210-11.
150. Id. at 211. Though frequently discussed, it is unlikely that the coercion theory is viable. See
id. ("to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion would plunge the law in endless
difficulties" and require acceptance of "a philosophical determinism by which choice becomes
impossible" (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937))); see also Nevada
v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding threatened withdrawal of ninety-five
percent of Nevada's federal highway funds).
151. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 215-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the power to
attach conditions should extend only to conditions that specify how federal funds should be spent or
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limitation is relevant because the Washington State Supreme Court found
that Congress lacked Spending Clause authority to amend
§ 409 because
' 15 2
the amended statute served "no valid federal interest.
Despite the commentary advocating a stricter relatedness limitation,'
United States Supreme Court precedent requires only a reasonable or
minimally rational relationship between spending condition and spending
purpose."M In South Dakota v. Dole,'55 Congress' mandate that states
adopt a national uniform drinking age was found to be "directly related"
to highway safety, a major goal of the federal highway spending. 6 The
Court noted simply that the condition was "reasonably calculated" to
address one "impediment" to a spending purpose." 7 Affirming this
limitation in New York v. United States,'58 the Court said only that
conditions must "bear some relationship" to the purpose of federal
spending 9 Courts have generally rejected arguments that spending
conditions are insufficiently related to spending purposes. 6
B.

Courts Have Found § 409 a Legitimate Exercise of Spending
Clause Power

Prior to the Guillen decision, each court ruling on § 409's
constitutionality had found it a legitimate exercise of congressional
spending power.16 ' In the most detailed Dole analysis of § 409, a

that fall within another of Congress' enumerated powers); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995).
152. Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 737, 31 P.3d 628, 651 (2001), cert. granted,70
U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2002) (No. 01-1229).
153. See supranote 151.
154. Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000).
155.
156.
157.
158.

483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Id. at208.
Id. at 209.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).

159. Id. at 167.
160. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding
implementation of child support enforcement system sufficiently related to purpose of welfare
grants); Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 874 (D.S.C. 2000) (same). But see United States v.
McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (D.Mass. 1998) (declaring 18 U.S.C. § 666 unconstitutional
as applied to defendant whose bribe did not involve any federal program).
161. Palacios v. La. & Delta R.R., Inc., 775 So. 2d 698,703-04 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Martinolich
v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 532 So. 2d 435, 438 (La. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. La. Dep't of
Transp. & Dev. v. Martinolich, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989); Sawyer v. Ill.C.G.R. Co., 606 So. 2d 1069,
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Louisiana court found that Congress' intrusion into the state's regulation
of its court system was constitutional because Louisiana's participation
in the federal funding scheme was voluntary.' 62 The court found that the
condition was related to a federal interest insofar as it encouraged states
to participate in a system of prioritization, ensuring deliberative spending
of federal highway funds.' 63 After the 1995 amendment, another
Louisiana appellate court reaffirmed this analysis. 164 The Guillen court is
the first to have declared § 409 unconstitutional.'
V.

IN GUILLEN V. PIERCE COUNTY, THE WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT DECLARED THE 1995 AMENDMENT TO
§ 409 UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In Guillen v. Pierce County, the Washington State Supreme Court
held that the 1995 addition of "or collected" to § 409 exceeded Congress'
constitutional powers and violated state sovereignty! 6 Interpreting the
amended statute to extend a privilege to any highway data collected for
any purpose and held by any public entity once the data is used for
federal funding purposes, 67 the court declared the amendment
unconstitutional.' 68 The court limited § 409's constitutionally permissible
reach to its pre-1995 form, in which it covered only documents originally
created for the purposes enumerated in § 409.169

1074 (Miss. 1992); Claspill v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 793 S.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Mo. 1990), cert. denied,498
U.S. 984 (1990).
162. Martinolich, 532 So. 2d at 438. See also Sawyer, 606 So. 2d at 1074 ("[i]t is a voluntary
program ... [d]uly authorized officials of this state, however, have committed us... and it does not
strike us outrageous that we should accede to the federal government's rules and regulations").
163. Martinolich, 532 So. 2d at 438.
164. Palacios,775 So. 2d at 703.
165. See Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 744, 31 P.3d 628, 655 (2001), cert.
granted,70 U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29,2002) (No. 01-1229).
166. Id. at 743-44, 31 P.3d at 655.
167. Id. at 726-28, 31 P.3d at 645-46.
168. Id. at 702-03, 31 P.3d at 633.
169. ld. at 744, 31 P.3d at 655.

Guillen v. Pierce County
A.

Factsand ProceduralHistory

The plaintiff in Guillen alleged that Pierce County's negligent design
of an intersection caused his wife's fatal automobile collision."' 0 The
intersection provided stop signs for cars entering from one street, but no
traffic control signals for cars entering from the other street. 7' To
advance his theory that the intersection warranted a four-way stop, 72 the
plaintiff sought discovery regarding the intersection's accident history
and traffic patterns. 173
Pierce County refused to disclose certain documents relating to the
accident history and traffic patterns, invoking 23 U.S.C. § 409.'74 The
disputed documents included accident reports and statistics prepared by
law enforcement agencies, collision diagrams prepared by a county
employee to evaluate the intersection's design, and a draft letter from the
director of public works to a city council member;17 also withheld were
vehicle volume summaries, signal warrant evaluations,1 7 6 six-year
transportation plans,"V and traffic impact analyses. 17' According to the
county, it had used these documents in an ongoing effort to identify
candidates for federal safety enhancement funding. 179 The trial court

170. Id. at 706, 31 P.3d at 634. After accepting review in Guillen, the Washington State Supreme
Court granted direct review of a trial court discovery order in Whitmer v. Yuk, consolidating the two
cases. Id. at 710, 31 P.3d at 637. Whitmer involved a similar negligence claim against Pierce County
and the City of Lakewood. For purposes of this Note, the important difference between the cases is
that the Whitmer defendants asserted the § 409 privilege for traffic volume data as well as for
accident information.
171. Plaintiff's Complaint at 2, Guillen v. Pierce County, No. 98-2-06119-2 (filed April 10, 1998)
(on file with the Washington Law Review).
172. Id. See also supranotes 8-9.
173. See Guillen v. Pierce County, 96 Wash. App. 862, 867, 982 P.2d 123, 127 (1999). Prior to
filing their tort claims, both the Guillen and Whitmer plaintiffs submitted public records requests for
similar information. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 711-16, 31 P.3d 637-40. Issues surrounding
Washington's Public Disclosure Act are beyond the scope of this Note.
174. Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 706, 31 P.3d at 634-35.
175. Id. at 704-05, 31 P.3d at 634.
176. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
178. These documents were withheld only in Whitmer. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 708, 31 P.3d

at 636.
at 724-25, 31 P.3d at 644-45. In Guillen, the county had also used the materials to apply
179. IaM
for federal project funding. See id. at 703, 31 P.3d at 633. No federal funding had been requested for
the Whitmer intersection. Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 725, 31 P.3d at 645.
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nevertheless ordered Pierce County to disclose the documents, and the
county appealed the order. 8 °
A Washington state appellate court largely affirmed the trial court's
ruling,' 8 ' but did not adopt either party's interpretation of § 409's scope.
The plaintiff argued that § 409 applied only to materials originally
created for the purpose of seeking federal highway funds. 8 2 The county
argued that materials and data were unavailable, "in any form" and from
any agency, once an agency had collected them pursuant to § 152.183 The
appellate court, in contrast, distinguished between agencies that collect
or compile information pursuant to § 152, such as county highway
departments, and those that collect or compile information for purposes
unrelated to § 152, such as county sheriffs' offices."s The court
concluded that § 409 does not create a privilege for materials held by an
agency that collected or compiled them for purposes unrelated to
§ 152. i85 Noting that the plaintiff limited his request to documents held
by law enforcement agencies,186 the appellate court ordered discovery of
documents related to law enforcement accident investigations.' 87
B.

Broadly Construing the 1995 Amendment, the Washington State
Supreme CourtDeclared the Amended Statute Unconstitutional

On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court reviewed the scope
of the amended § 409 and requested supplemental briefing on its
constitutionality.188 After reviewing § 409 case law from other states and

180. Id. at 706, 31 P.3d at 635.
181. Guillen v. Pierce County, 96 Wash. App. 862, 874, 982 P.2d 123, 130 (Div. 2 1999).
182. See Respondent's Brief at 13, Guillen v. Pierce County, 96 Wash. App. 862, 982 P.2d 123
(Div. 2 1999) (No. 22614-6-11).
183. Guillen, 96 Wash. App. at 872,982 P.2d at 129.
184. Id. at 871,982 P.2d at 129.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 874, 982 P.2d at 130. In its amicus brief, the State of Washington argued that the Court
of Appeals misapplied the distinction it proposed, because the plaintiff's request was directed to the
attorney representing the county's public works department, and not to the sheriffs office or the
state patrol. See Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Wash. at 7, Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d
696, 31 P.3d 628 (2001) (No. 68535-5).
187. Guillen, 96 Wash. App. at 872, 982 P.2d at 129. The court did apply the privilege to a letter
containing federal funding information, and would have protected a collision diagram had the county
proved that the diagram's author was engaged in highway planning duties. Id. at 873, 982 P.2d at
873. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
188. Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 710,31 P.3d at 637.
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analyzing the appellate court's holding in Guillen, the Washington State
Supreme Court found that the 1995 amendment substantially broadened
§ 409's scope. 89 According to the court, § 409 now covered all materials
and data, in all forms and locations, once they had been collected and
used to evaluate sites for § 152 funding.190 Rejecting arguments that the
Spending, Commerce, and Necessary and Proper Clauses authorized
such an amendment, the court declared the amended statute
unconstitutional,' concluding that § 409 could be enforced only in its
pre-1995 form. 9 2
Analyzing the 1995 amendment in the context of pre-amendment
§ 409 case law,' 93 the Washington State Supreme Court concluded that it
represented a broad expansion of the privilege. The court first indicated
that early state court interpretations of § 409 restricted its scope to
materials "specifically created" for federal funding programs, excluding
from the privilege reports and data created for a distinct purpose, then
collected for use in federal funding materials.'94 After emphasizing these
courts' concerns that broader interpretations would result in the
exclusion of all facts included in final § 152 reports,195 the Washington
State Supreme Court indicated that congressional disagreement with
these "restricted readings" had motivated the 1995 amendment. 6
Presuming that a material change in the wording of a law changes the
law,'97 the court cast doubt on Congress' express intent to merely
"clarify" § 409 and suggested that a broad change was intended.'
The Washington State Supreme Court declined to accept the appellate
court's distinction between materials created and held by law
189. ld. at 726-27, 31 P.3d at 645-46.
190. Id.
191. Id. at744, 31 P.3dat655.
192. Id. at 743-44, 31 P.3d at 655. A concurrence of three justices argued that the five-justice
majority interpreted the statute too broadly; the concurrence would have adopted the Court of
Appeals' distinction and found the statute constitutional. Id. at 751-53, 31 P.3d at 658-59 (Madsen,
J., concurring).
193. Id. at 717-24, 31 P.3d at 640-45.
194. Id. at 718-19,31 P.3d at 641 (empahsis in original).
195. Id. at 720-22,31 P.3d at 642-43. Cf supra notes 95-96.
196. Id. at 723, 31 P.3d at 644.

197. Id.
198. See id. at 723-24, 31 P.3d at 644. The court described the amended statute as "a legal black
hole into which state and local governments can drop virtually all accident materials and facts,
simply by showing that such materials and 'raw data' are also 'collected' and used to identify and
rank candidates" for federal projects. ld. (emphasis in original).
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enforcement agencies and materials held by highway planning
agencies. 99 Calling such a distinction "unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice," 2 0 the court reasoned that changes in technology
would make such a legal distinction meaningless:20 1 if highway records
were created in digital format and stored in a statewide database
accessible by various agencies for different purposes, the fact that one
agency accessed the database to assess candidates for § 152 funding
would bar access to the entire database.20 2 Rejecting the distinction, the
court held that § 409 covered any publicly collected materials or datain any form or location-that had also been "collected and used" for
federal programs. 203
The Washington State Supreme Court next considered and rejected
the three sources of congressional authority advanced by the county-the
Spending Clause,' the Commerce Clause, 20 5 and the Necessary and
Proper Clause 2 6 -holding that Congress could constitutionally restrict
only materials and data "originally created for" a federal funding
program.20 7 In its analysis of Spending Clause authority, the court stated
that extending a privilege to data prepared for routine state purposes,
simply because it was also used for federal purposes, served "no valid
federal interest in the operation of the federal safety enhancement
program." 20 8 The court apparently based its conclusion on Dole's
relatedness limitation, concluding that § 409's evidentiary exclusion was
not sufficiently related to the highway safety enhancement purposes of
§ 152.209

199. Id. at 726-27, 31 P.3d at 645-46.
200. Id. at 727, 31 P.3d at 646.
201. Id. at 727-28, 31 P.3d at 646.
202. Id. at 728, 31 P.3d at 646.
203. See id. at 727, 31 P.3d at 646.
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 734, 31 P.3d at 649.
205. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 734,31 P.3d at 649.
206. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 734, 31 P.3d at 649. Analysis of
this clause was not a major part of the court's holding. See id. at 743, 31 P.3d at 654-55.
207. Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 746,31 P.3d at 656 (emphasis in original).
208. Id. at 737, 31 P.3d at 651.
209. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 736-37, 31 P.3d at 651; see also id. at 735 n.34, 31 P.3d at 650
n.34 (quoting extensively from Justice O'Connor's Dole dissent advocating a stricter relatedness
requirement).

Guillen v. Pierce County
The Washington State Supreme Court also rejected authority under
the Commerce Clause. 210 Though it cited recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in support of the proposition that regulated activities must
substantially affect interstate commerce, 211 the court based its decision on
the conclusion that § 409 is not an "integral part" of Congress' legitimate
regulation of the federal-aid highway system. 2 In each aspect of its
constitutional analysis, the court concluded that Congress lacked the
authority to control the use of state materials in state courts, unless a
federal funding program was the but-for cause of their creation3
Under the Washington State Supreme Court's holding in Guillen,
§ 409 protects only materials originally created for, and specifically
required by particular federal programs.2 4 Because the record contained
insufficient facts for the court to apply this standard to the disputed
documents, the court remanded the case for further proceedings.21 5 The
court's ruling has been stayed pending a grant of certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court.2 16
VI. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE
CONSTRUED § 409 NARROWLY, THEREBY AVOIDING A
CONSTITUTIONAL HOLDING
In concluding that Congress' 1995 amendment broadly extended the
scope of § 409, the Washington State Supreme Court disregarded
reasonable alternative interpretations that would have recognized the
constitutionality of the amendment. A narrow interpretation of § 409 is
consistent with congressional intent and general principles for construing
evidentiary privileges. Interpreted narrowly, in light of its purpose, the
amended § 409 protects only documents in the possession of an entity

210. ld.at737-42,31 P.3dat651-54.
211. Id. at 740-41, 31 P.3d at 653 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-66 (1995)
and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-11 (2000)).
212. Id. The Washington State Supreme Court relied on Hodel v. Indiana, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court indicated that a complex regulatory program can be constitutional "without a
showing that every single facet of the program is independently and directly related to a valid
congressional goal [provided that] the challenged provisions are an integral part" of the broader
program. 452 U.S. 314,329 n.17 (1981). See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 742, 31 P.3d at 654.
213. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at 744, 31 P.3d at 655.
214. Id. at 745, 31 P.3d at 655.
215. Id. at746, 31 P.3dat656
216. Guillen v. Pierce County, 70 U.S.LW. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2002) (No. 01-1229).
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that created or obtained them "for the purpose" of a federal program. As
such, the statute continues to represent a constitutional exercise of
Congress' spending power.
A.

Like Other Evidentiary Privileges,§ 409 Should Be Construed
Narrowly and Applied To Achieve Its Purpose

When construing evidentiary privileges, courts should identify the
217
purpose of a privilege and restrict its application accordingly.
Privileges are to be construed narrowly and applied to promote specific
activities or behaviors.1 s Courts have restricted privileges when a given
application would not encourage the activities or behaviors the privilege
was designed to promote, 1 9 or would exclude more evidence than is
reasonably necessary to promote the identified purpose.20 Courts should
likewise restrict the § 409 privilege to applications likely to encourage
the activities it was designed to promote.
1.

The Purpose of§ 409 is to EncourageData Collection

Given the lack of direct legislative history,22' § 409 should be
interpreted in light of its place within the broader federal highway safety
scheme222 and applied to promote the objectives of particular federal
highway safety programs. 223 Legislative history demonstrates that
Congress enacted the relevant highway safety programs to encourage
states and localities to engage in record-keeping and prioritization that
would permit methodical elimination of specific highway risk factors.'
Yet because possession of more highway hazard data increases the
evidence available to plaintiffs in highway negligence cases,2' states and

217. See, e.g., Kitts v. Norfolk and W. Ry., 152 F.R.D. 78, 80-81 (S.D.W.Va. 1993) (viewing
section 409 in light of principles governing all privileges); see also supra notes 65-79 and
accompanying text.
218. See supranotes 65-66 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
220. See supranotes 70-75 and accompanying text.
221. See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
222. The privilege is codified in chapter 4 of Title 23 U.S.C., entitled "Highway Safety."
223. The relevant programs are those identified in § 409-23 U.S.C. §§ 130, 144, and 152-and
adopted in the Highway Safety Act of 1973. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
224. See supranote 30 and accompanying text.
225. See supranotes 7-9 and accompanying text.

Guillen v. Pierce County
localities may be reluctant to gather some useful data.226 This reluctance
impedes full realization of the federal objective, and § 409 addresses this
obstacle. 7 Section 409 promotes the increased collection of highway
hazard data by neutralizing the litigation impact of data and materials
whose collection is directly motivated by participation in particular
federal programs. 228
Though it is possible to infer a broader purpose for § 409, the absence
of clear congressional intent to create a sweeping exclusion supports this
narrower litigation-neutralizing objective. Conceived expansively, § 409
could be an attempt to ensure the veracity of any highway information
supplied to the federal government. 9 That is, if litigation availability
diminishes the accuracy of all highway information, Congress might
have wished to shield any data used for a federal program from the time
it was first recorded."o This conception of the congressional purpose
should be rejected. First, it is not clear that a change in litigation
availability would increase the accuracy of all highway data.2 t
Government entities have various reasons for recording basic highway
data, many of which provide an incentive to record accurate data. 2 For
instance, traffic volume data that accurately demonstrates regional
transportation growth'2' might result in increased funding for new
construction; likewise, the accuracy of a law enforcement officer's
accident reports could be grounds for career promotion. Indeed, if
ensuring that the federal government would receive accurate data had
been Congress' principal objective, it presumably would have extended

226. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Wash. at 4, Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash.
2d 696, 31 P.3d 628 (2001) (No. 68535-5) (stating that use of safety data in tort litigation "provides
a disincentive for government to compile the information needed to accurately prioritize and
systematically fund highway improvement projects"). See also supranote 54.
227. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (funding condition reasonably
calculated to address particular impediment to statutory purpose).
228. The Guillen court emphasized that Congress enacted § 409 to avoid altering the balance of
litigation advantages between plaintiffs and governments. Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d
696, 717-18, 31 P.3d 628, 641 (2001), cert. granted, 70 U.S.LW. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2002) (No.
01-1229) (emphasizing congressional intent to avoid giving plaintiffs an added advantage).
229. See supranote 54.
230. This is the result of the Guillen court's statutory interpretation. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at
727, 31 P.3d at 646.
231. Cf. supranotes 74-75 and accompanying text.
232 See supranotes 38-41 and accompanying text.
233. See WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 468-86-110 (2001).
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the privilege to data required by other federal highway safety
programs. 4
Second, creating a privilege for every piece of highway information
used for the hazard elimination program from the time it was first
recorded would be a significant federal intrusion into the states'
traditional management of their court systems. 235 Courts require a clear
statement when adopting a statutory interpretation that alters the
traditional federal-state balance. 6 The addition of the words "or
collected" does not clearly declare a congressional intent that federal law
determine the admissibility, in state court, of highway data routinely
collected for state and local purposes, simply because that data is used in
237
a federal program.
2.

Statutory Ambiguities Should Be Resolved To Achieve the Narrow
Goal of NeutralizingLitigationDisadvantages

Ambiguities concerning the application § 409 should be resolved in
light of the statute's purpose of neutralizing litigation advantages. Two
principal statutory ambiguities have survived the 1995 amendment: first,
the amendment did not address divergent interpretations of "the purpose"
for which privileged data must have been collected; second, by using the
passive voice to describe privileged material ("data... collected"),
Congress failed to clarify who must have collected privileged data. The
narrow purpose of making federally-motivated data collection litigationneutral should guide construction of § 409's federal purpose requirement
and identification of documents that may constitute "data... collected"
for this purpose.

234. 23 U.S.C. § 402 also mandates accident recording and reporting. See supra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text; supranote 42.
235. See Martinolich v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 532 So. 2d 435 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the
state's regulation of court system is "as fundamental a function of its sovereignty as the normal
exercise of its police power"), cert. denied sub nom. La. Dep't of Transp. and Dev. v. Martinolich,
490 U.S. 1109 (1989).
236. See supra note 147.
237. Cf. Kitts v. Norfolk and W. Ry., 152 F.R.D. 78, 82 (S.D.W.Va. 1993) (noting that if
Congress had intended for data routinely collected before federal safety programs existed "to be
thrown into the safety enhancement pot and accorded protection," it could have included language or
legislative history to this effect).

Guillen v. Pierce County
a.

Defining the FederalPurpose

Courts should read literally the dictate that privileged materials be
compiled or collected for "the purpose" of a hazard elimination
project. 8 Materials collected to comply with a state law mandate would
not have been collected for "the purpose" of a federal program. 9 This
reading is consistent with the statute's purpose because a privilege
cannot encourage reluctant states and localities to collect the very same
data that state law requires them to collect. Rather than mitigating an
obstacle to achievement of the federal program's objective, applying
§ 409 to materials required by state law would give defendant
governments an advantage unconnected to participation in the federal
funding program.2 40 Courts have the power to limit statutory privileges to
the minimum the statutory purpose requires;24 courts should exercise
their power to implement § 409's purpose by construing the statute
exactly as it reads.242
b.

Identifying "Data... Collected"

The § 409 privilege for "data... collected" should be available only
to data-collectors motivated by the requisite federal purpose and to
documents in their possession. This interpretation recognizes that data
may be "collected" in two distinct acts-first by the entity that originally
records it, and again by an entity that gathers copies of the resulting
records.243 The 1995 amendment clarified that when the requisite federal
purpose motivates an entity to obtain documents from various sources,
courts must grant the § 409 privilege to those pre-existing documents as
well as to any documents the entity creates. 2' However, the amendment
did not require courts to extend the privilege to documents held by the

238. See supranotes 99 and 102 and accompanying text.
239. Cf. supranotes 122-23 and accompanying text.
240. See Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696,751, 31 P.3d 628,658 (2001) (Madsen, J.,
concurring), cert. granted,70 U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Apr. 29,2002) (No. 01-1229).
241. See supranotes 70-72 and accompanying text.
242. The Guillen court, in contrast, broadened the statute's narrow purpose by interpreting it to
cover all data and materials collected "for, interalia, the § 152 purpose." Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d at
727, 31 P.3d at 646 (emphasis added).
243. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wash. State Trial Lawyers Ass'n Found. at 11, Guillen v. Pierce
County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 31 P.3d 628 (No. 68535-5) (2001).
244. See supranotes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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data's original "collector," when that entity created the documents for
state purposes. 245 Documents created for state purposes, and requested
from their original creator, should not become privileged simply because
another public entity gathers them for § 409's federal purpose. 4 6 This
interpretation is consistent with the Washington State Supreme Court's
application of the statutory privilege for the proceedings of hospital
review committees: 47 the statutory purpose of making committee
investigations litigation-neutral did not require protection of information
available from original sources, simply because it was used in a reviewcommittee meeting."
An interpretation of § 409 that distinguishes between data as collected
by different public entities need not result in a privilege for all state
highway records, even if they were kept in a single electronic database.24 9
Records created for state purposes and later accessed for federal
purposes would remain available. First, the collection of all highwayrelated documents into a statewide database would not be motivated by
"the purpose" of obtaining federal funding, given existing state law datacollection mandatesY0° Furthermore, courts could imply a caveat
consistent with that applied to other privileges, by refusing to permit a
public entity to create the privilege simply by transferring its records to a
funding applicant for storage. For example, a client cannot create the
attorney-client privilege by giving pre-existing documents to an attorney,
even for the purpose of obtaining legal advice." Similarly, entities
posting documents to a database would not be permitted to claim a
privilege for documents created for state purposes simply because they
had been "transferred" to another entity. This caveat would also defeat
any temptation to shift documents to different offices in order to avoid
disclosure.

245. See supranotes 114-20 and accompanying text.
246. Section 409 will require plaintiffs' counsel to be "careful and sometimes inventive" in
drafting discovery requests, seeking information from several public sources. KENWORTHY, supra
note 9, § 11-8(C). See also supra note 186.
247. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
249. See Guillen, 144 Wash. 2d 698, 727-28, 31 P.3d 628, 646 (2001); see also supra notes 199202 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
251. See supranote 68 and accompanying text.

Guillen v. Pierce County
c.

ProposedInterpretation

With the statutory ambiguities surrounding purpose and possession
resolved to effectuate § 409's narrow purpose, the privilege would apply
to (1) all materials created or recorded for "the purpose" of a federal
program, whether raw data or "end products" specifically required by the
program; and (2) materials originally created or recorded for state
purposes, when requested from an entity that had obtained the materials
for the requisite federal purpose. This interpretation would permit
discovery of many of the items requested by the Guillen plaintiffsincluding accident reports, basic accident statistics, and traffic volume
data that state law required the county to collect. Yet this interpretation
might preclude discovery of other documents-such as collision
diagrams used to plan specific highway improvements 52 -that an entity
prepared or obtained only because of the federal funding opportunity.
3.

NarrowInterpretationIncorporatesthe 1995 Amendment

This interpretation is not only consistent with the original litigationneutralizing purpose of § 409, but it also incorporates the limited
broadening effect of the 1995 amendment. Prior to the amendment, in
some courts, "data compiled" did not include factual raw data ' presumably even if the data had been recorded for the sole purpose of a
federal program. In these courts, "data compiled" also excluded preexisting materials an entity gathered to prepare "end products" for
federal funding. 4 This interpretation failed to protect an entity from
increased risk of liability when it was motivated by a federal program to
produce or obtain new types of data. 5 By permitting a funding applicant
to claim the § 409 privilege for any materials it possessed because of its
participation in a federal program-whether it originally created the
materials or not-Congress effected a meaningful change to § 409, but
did not dictate a change in the requisite federal purpose. As such, courts
may interpret the federal purpose requirement narrowly to avoid a
constitutional holding.
252. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
253. See supranotes 91-94 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
255. See Guillen, 96 Wash. App. 862, 870, 982 P.2d 123, 128 (1999) ("An injured claimant can
be aided by reports or data collected pursuant to Section 152 as much as by reports or data compiled
pursuant to Section 152.") (emphasis in original).
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Narrowly Interpreted,§ 409 Is a Valid Exercise of Congressional
Spending Power

In addition to conforming to congressional intent and principles for
construing evidentiary privileges, a narrow interpretation of § 409 also
represents a saving construction that allows courts to avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality.25 6 Section 409 is a spending condition that the state
may escape by declining federal highway safety improvement funds.
When applied to encourage state and local recordkeeping, § 409 is
rationally related to the federal interest in increasing national highway
safety.
Section 409 is not a direct congressional mandate; it attaches only
upon a state's voluntary decision to apply for federal highway safety
improvement funds." The Washington legislature has voluntarily
applied for and received federal highway safety funds; furthermore, it
has affirmatively accepted conditions on federal highway grants. 8 In
addition to these direct actions, the legislature has authorized the state
department of transportation to enter into agreements necessary to secure
federal highway funds, 9 thus binding the state and its political
subdivisions to the conditions of any agreement entered under this
authority.
Still, spending conditions may be unconstitutional if they lack a
rational relationship to the federal interest in the particular policy or
program that the spending supports. 26' Although courts have been
extremely deferential in scrutinizing this relationship,262 the Guillen
opinion illustrates serious constitutional problems with construing § 409
expansively. Indeed, the federal programs data-collection objectives are
not rationally advanced by a privilege that encourages public entities to

256. See supranotes 80-84.
257. See supra note 162.
258. "he state of Washington hereby assents to the... terms and conditions of the grant of
money provided in [a 1916 federal highway funding act] ...and all acts, grants, and appropriations
amendatory and supplementary thereto and affecting the state of Washington." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 47.04.050 (2001). Though this statute predates § 409, the legislature reauthorizes the state
transportation budget, including federal appropriations, each biennium. See, e.g., 2000 Wash. Laws,
ch. 3, §§ 217, 219, 221-23, 226, 232.
259. Id. § 47.04.060.
260. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
261. See supranote 148 and accompanying text.
262. See supranotes 153-60 and accompanying text.

Guillen v. Pierce County
collect data that state laws 2 63 -and other federal laws 2 -- requirethem to
collect. That is, when state law requires data collection, use of the data in
litigation does not impede achievement of federal objectives.26
However, construing § 409 as an attack on a primary impediment to
the objective of the federal safety programs-state and local reluctance
to collect data-causes it to operate in much the same way as the statute
considered in South Dakota v. Dole. In Dole, the Supreme Court found
that because varied drinking ages impaired the federal spending goal of
increasing highway safety, the federal government could require states to
adopt a national minimum drinking age in exchange for highway safety
funds.~" Narrowly construed, § 409 likewise addresses an impediment to
a federal spending purpose: it lessens a state or locality's reluctance to
create or obtain new types of highway hazard data. Thus, insofar as
§ 409 encourages funding applicants to create or obtain highway
materials that they are not otherwise obligated to create or obtain, it
promotes the federal programs' operation and objectives.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Courts should adopt a narrow construction of § 409 to avoid a finding
of unconstitutionality. Given its sparse legislative history and ambiguous
language, courts should interpret 23 U.S.C. § 409 to neutralize litigation
disadvantages created by the data-collection requirements of particular
federal programs. Applications of the privilege that do not further that
purpose, or that exclude more evidence than is necessary to achieve that
purpose, should be avoided. In particular, the privilege should not be
applied to data and materials that state law requires highway authorities
to collect.
This interpretation comports with general principles for construing
evidentiary privileges, and allows the court to avoid making unnecessary
constitutional law. The doctrine of avoiding constitutional holdings is
particularly relevant when one of fifty state high courts reviews the
constitutionality of a federal statute. While state courts certainly have the
power to invalidate federal laws within their jurisdictions, this power
should be reserved for clear cases of unconstitutionality in which no
263. See supra Part LB.
264. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
265. See supranotes 238-40 and accompanying text.
266. Id. at 207.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:951, 2002

reasonable statutory alternative appears. A narrow construction of § 409
is reasonable and eliminates any constitutional defects in Congress'
exercise of its broad spending power.

